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II. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This case involves the failure of Appellant to pay for a 2012 big game hunt in Zimbabwe. 
Appellant was obligated to pay Respondent for the services provided to him by HHK Safaris 
(Pvt) Ltd during his time in Zimbabwe pursuant to a similar contractual arrangement that Appellant 
honored in 2010 and 2011. The instant action was initiated after Appellant refused and otherwise 
failed to pay for the services provided in 2012. 
B. ProceduralBackground 
On June 28, 2013, Respondent filed its Verified Complaint against Appellant wherein 
Respondent set forth a cause of action for breach of contract based upon Respondent's failure to pay 
for a 2012 big game hunt in Zimbabwe. R., pp. 8-15. Appellant filed his Answer on January 6, 
2014. R., pp. 16-18. In his Answer, Appellant admitted that he had not paid the amount sought by 
Respondent. Id. However, Appellant alleged three affirmative defenses, 1) that Appellant did not 
have a contractual relationship with Respondent, 2) that Respondent was an unlicensed collection 
agency, and 3) that Appellant's claims against HHK Safaris (Pvt) Ltd exceeded the amount sought 
by Respondent. Id. 
On July 14, 2014, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment requesting that the trial 
court determine that Appellant was obligated to pay Respondent $26,040.00 and accrued 
prejudgment interest for the services provided during the 2012 big game hunt in Zimbabwe, that 
Respondent was not subject to the Idaho Collection Agency Act, Idaho Code Section 26-2221, et 
seq., and that Appellant was entitled to an offset against Respondent. R., pp. 19-21. The trial court 
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heard Respondent's motion for summary judgment on September 2, 2014. Tr., p. 2. The trial court 
ruled from the bench at the hearing on Respondent's motion for summary judgment and granted 
Respondent's motion for summary judgment. Tr., pp 28-32. 
In doing so, the trial court determined that there were no disputed issues of material fact and 
that Appellant was liable to Respondent for the services provided during the 2012 big game hunt in 
Zimbabwe. Tr., p. 29, 11. 1-25. With regard to the offsets claimed by Appellant related to 
Appellant's failure to receive the tusks from the 2012 hunt and Appellant's dissatisfaction with the 
camping arrangements, the trial court determined that Appellant had failed to present any obligation 
on the part of Respondent or HHK Safaris (Pvt) Ltd that would create the basis for an offset. Tr., p. 
30, 11. 2-23. With regard to the offsets claimed by Appellant related to Appellant's 2010 big game 
hunt, the trial court determined that Appellant had not presented a counterclaim or a third party 
claim to the trial court on that basis. Tr., p. 30, 11. 3-9. The trial court also determined that C. Martin 
Wood, Ill's ownership interests in Respondent and HHK Safaris (Pvt) Ltd satisfied the requirements 
of Idaho Code Section 26-2239(10) and therefore Respondent was not governed by the Idaho 
Collection Agency Act. Tr., p. 29, 11. 1-11. Appellant now seeks a reversal of the trial court's 
decision based upon arguments that the trial court erred when it determined that there were no 
disputed issues of fact, that Respondent was entitled to initiate this action, that the Idaho 
Collection Agency Act was not applicable to Respondent, and that Appellant failed to properly 
raise the offsets claimed. R, p. 164. 
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C. Statement of Facts 
From November 22, 2102 to December 1, 2012, Appellant Mike Von Jones hunted big 
game in Zimbabwe ("2012 Hunt"). R., p. 46, ~!3- The services that Appellant received in 
Zimbabwe during the 2012 hunt were provided by employees of HHK Safaris (Pvt) Ltd ("HHK"), 
an affiliate of Safaris Unlimited. Id. at ,r4; R., p. 57, ,r13. When the 2012 Hunt concluded and while 
still in Zimbabwe, Jones was presented an invoice from Safaris Unlimited in the amount of 
$26,040.00 by a professional hunter named Derek Adams. R., p. 47, ,rs. Derek Adams is an HHK 
employee and is commonly referred to as Gomez. R., p. 46, ,r,rl-2. Appellant signed the Safaris 
Unlimited invoice in Derek Adam's presence when it was presented to Appellant by Derek 
Adams. R., p. 47, ,rs. The signature found on Safaris Unlimited belongs to Appellant and is the 
same as the signature that appears on payments to Safaris Unlimited for big game hunts in 2010 
and 2011 and other documents signed by Jones. Id at ,I8; R., p. 57, ,rs. In addition, Appellant 
admits that he was presented with an invoice setting out the animals hunted and that he signed 
the invoice that he was presented with. R, pp. 127-128. Appellant is obligated to pay Respondent 
for the daily fees associated with the trip, the trophy and governmental fees associated with 
animals harvested, and a dip and pack fee. R., p. 57, ,r14. With regard to the tusks from the 
elephants harvested by Appellant, Appellant is the owner of those sport-hunted African elephant 
trophies and the trophies have no commercial value. R., p. 38, ,r,r8-10. 
The 2012 Hunt was different from the 2010 and 2011 big game hunts Appellant had 
engaged in with Respondent and HHK because Appellant contacted HHK directly to inquire 
about the availability of a hunt. R., p. 38, ,I2. Prior to the 2012 hunt, HHK informed Appellant 
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that he would be sharing the camp with other hunters from South Africa and was given the 
option to hunt after the South African hunters had left. Id. at ,I7. HHK required Appellant to pay 
Respondent for the services provided by HHK in 2012 and Appellant was aware that he was 
required to pay Respondent for the services provided. R., pp. 37-38, ,I,I3-4. Appellant previously 
hunted big game with HHK in 2010 and 2011 and on both of those occasions Appellant was 
obligated to pay Respondent for the services provided by HHK. Id. Appellant expressed concern 
with the size of the tusks from the elephant that was harvested in 2010. R., p. 144-149. However, 
Respondent received payment in full from Appellant for both the 2010 and 2011 big game hunts 
after the 2010 elephant was harvested. R., p. 58, ,II 8. In addition, Appellant instructed HHK to 
hold the trophies from the 2010 in HHK's possession and not delivery the trophies to Appellant's 
taxidermist. R., p. 148. 
On December 6, 2012, Jennifer Ryan ("Ryan"), the general manager of Respondent, 
emailed Appellant a final invoice for the 2012 Hunt. R., p. 58, iI12. Ryan's email stated, "It was 
brought to my attention that this invoice is slightly different from the one you received in camp 
because Gomez didn't include the cameraman on the invoice - just so you know the difference. 
Id. Appellant replied to Ryan's email on December 6, 2012 and stated that he had never paid 
extra for a cameraman and that he was concerned with the quality of service that he had received 
during the 2012 Hunt. Id at ,I13. Appellant did not assert that he was not provided an invoice in 
Zimbabwe or that he was not obligated to pay Respondent for the services provided, rather 
Appellant only objected to the amount added to the invoice for the cameraman. Id. Ryan 
provided Appellant with a revised invoice on December 7, 2012 which was the same amount, 
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$26,040.00, as the invoice that was presented to Appellant by Derek Adams in Zimbabwe. Id at 
ill 4. Ryan also instructed Appellant that Graham Hingeston ("Hingeston") had asked that 
Appellant send any concerns that Appellant may have directly to Hingeston. Id. at ~15. Appellant 
did not contact anyone at Safaris Unlimited or HHK. Id.; R., p. 38, ,i6. Appellant then refused to 
pay the $26,040.00 due and owing for the 2012 Hunt. R., p. 58, ,i7. 
As Appellant has asserted that Respondent is violating the Idaho Collection Agency Act, 
Idaho Code Section 26-2221, et seq., by bringing this action, it is important to acknowledge that 
Respondent and HHK are related by common ownership. R., p. 17; See R, p. 32, ,i4. Specifically, 
Respondent is a Georgia limited liability company owned entirely by C. Martin Wood, III. R., p. 56, 
,i2. HHK is a private limited corporation organized under the laws of Zimbabwe of which forty 
percent (40%) is owned by Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited. R., p. 57, ,i4. Bulawayo 
Trading Company (Pvt) Limited is also a private limited corporation organized under the laws of 
Zimbabwe of which fifty percent (50%) is owned Mr. Wood. R., p. 56, ,i3. Respondent was 
organized by Mr. Wood to broker safari and big game hunting services for clients located in the 
United States. R., p. 57, ,is. Respondent deals with HHK exclusively to provide the services sought 
by those clients. Id. at ,i6. In the normal course of business, Respondent is entitled to the difference 
between HHK's cost to provide safari and big game hunting services and the price charged the 
client. Id. at i!7. Respondent's clients are obligated to pay Respondent, which is turn is obligated to 
pay HHK for the services provided to the clients in Africa. Id at ,is. Coordinating and providing 
safari and big game hunting services to clients in the United States is Respondent's principal 
business. Id at ,i9. Safaris Unlimited also assists clients with obtaining accommodations, 
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transportation, and any necessary permits. Id. The collection of debts is only an incidental part of 
Respondent's business. Id. at 110. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard for this Court's review of the trial court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment is the same standard as used by the trial court in ruling on the original motion. Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). Once a motion for 
summary judgment is made, "[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the Declarations, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as matter of 
law." G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Company, 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 853-54 
(1991); Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). The primary purpose of a summary judgment is to 
allow the courts the ability to avoid unnecessary litigation. If the facts are not in dispute and they 
lead to a legal conclusion which cannot be denied, a summary judgment is proper and should be 
granted to the moving party. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 444, 690 P.2d 896, 899 (1984). 
In situations where the court will be the trier of fact and "where there is a conflict as to 
the meaning or inferences to be drawn from the evidence, it is the function of the trier of fact to 
make such determination." Pierson v. Jones, 102 Idaho 82, 85, 625 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1981). 
Pierson was cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 
519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982) when the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following: 
Nevertheless, where the evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court 
rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, 
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despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences. 
Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982). Accordingly, the 
Court is "entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence 
properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." 
Intermountain Eye and Laser Centers, P.L.L.C. v. Miller, 127 P.3d 121, 142 Idaho 218 (Idaho 
2005). 
The nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials to avoid summary 
judgment. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Theriault v. A.H Robbins Company, 108 Idaho 303, 698 P.2d 365 (1985); 
McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). Rather, the nonmoving party's 
response must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(c). If the 
moving party asserts that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the 
nonmoving party to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). The 
nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact 
exists to establish a genuine issue. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 
P.2d 300, 313 (1999). Mere speculation or a scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not 
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. McCoy, 120 Idaho at 769,820 P.2d at 364. 
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Respondent is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-120 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. Appellant was obligated to pay Respondent for the services provided to Appellant by 
HHK during the 2012 Hunt and his failure to pay for those services constitutes a material 
breach of contract. 
In this situation it is irrelevant whether the services provided to Appellant during the 
2012 Hunt were provided by Appellant or HHK. Appellant became contractually obligated to 
Respondent when he signed the invoice presented by Derek Adams. R, p. 47, ,I5. The invoice 
presented to Appellant by Derek Adams constitutes an express contract for the payment of 
$26,040.00 to Respondent. In this situation, the consideration provided for Appellant's 
obligation to pay Respondent is the big game hunting services provided by HHK. However, the 
source of the consideration does not affect Appellant's obligation to Respondent. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that a third party can provide consideration for a 
contractual obligation in Sirius LC v. Erickson 144 Idaho 38, 42, 156 P.3d 539, 543 (2007). 
There the Idaho Supreme Court addressed whether a consideration must flow from the promisee 
of promissory note and not a third party and determined that contractual obligation could be 
supported by consideration offered by a third party. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 42, 156 
P.3d 539, 543 (2007). It should also be noted that while the Idaho Supreme Court addressed 
whether consideration existed for a promissory note, the Idaho Supreme Court was applying the 
law of contracts and not the law of negotiable instruments because the promissory note addressed 
in Sirius LC v. Erickson did not contain the words "to order" or "to bearer." Id. at 42, 543. 
Moreover, the prior course of dealing between Respondent, Appellant, and HHK 
establishes that invoice presented to Appellant in Zimbabwe and again presented to Appellant by 
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Respondent was more than an acknowledgment of the animals harvested. See Pocatello Hosp., 
LLCv. Quail Ridge Med. Investor, LLC, 156 Idaho 709,721,330 P.3d 1067, 1079 (2014). Based 
on his previous interactions with Respondent and HHK, Appellant understood that he was 
required to pay Respondent for the services provided by HHK. Appellant's refusal or otherwise 
failure to pay for the services provided during the 2012 Hunt constitutes a material breach of that 
contract. 
B. Respondent is not subject to the Idaho Collection Agency Act and even if HHK was 
considered to have assigned Appellant's obligation to Respondent, Respondent falls within 
the exemption provided by Idaho Code Section 26-2239(10). 
Respondent is not attempting to collect the debts of others in this situation and is not 
subject to the Idaho Collection Agency Act, Idaho Code Section 26-2221, et seq. ("ICCA"). 
Moreover, if Respondent were to be considered as attempting to collect an obligation owed by 
Appellant to HHK, as Appellant contends, Appellant is not subject to the ICCA because 
Respondent and HHK are related by common ownership. Idaho Code § 26-2239(10). C. Martin 
Wood, III is the sole owner of Safaris Unlimited and is a fifty percent ( 50%) owner of Bulawayo 
Trading Company (Pvt) Limited. Bulawayo Trading Company (Pvt) Limited is in turn a forty 
percent (40%) owner ofHHK. R, pp. 56-57, i!i!2-4. 
In addition to being related to HHK by common ownership, Respondent satisfies the 
remaining requirements ofldaho Code Section 26-2239(10), which provides: 
Any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are 
related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting 
as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom he is so related or affiliated and 
if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts. 
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Idaho Code § 26-2239(10). Respondent was organized to service the safari and big game hunting 
service needs of clients located in the United States. R, p. 57, fi5. Respondent deals with HHK 
exclusively to provide the safari and big game hunting services sought by clients in the United 
States. Id. at ft 6. The collection of debts is only an incidental part of Respondent's business. Id. at 
fil 0. Accordingly, even if Respondent was considered to be acting as a debt collector in this 
situation, it could only be considered to be doing so for HHK. Moreover, Respondent is not 
engaged in the business of collection of debts, its principal business is coordinating and 
providing safari and big game hunting services to clients in the United States. Id.at fi9. 
Respondent also assists clients with obtaining accommodations, transportation, and any 
necessary permits. Id. In the normal course of business, Respondent is entitled to the difference 
between HHK's cost to provide safari and big game hunting services and the price charged the 
client by Respondent. Id. at fi9. Respondent's clients are obligated to pay Respondent, which is 
turn is obligated to pay HHK for the services provided to the clients in Africa. Id. at fi8. 
Respondent's debt collection activates are no more than those of any other service based 
business which occasionally has clients that fail to pay for services provided. 
The ICCA like the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., 
was intended to regulate the practices of independent debt collectors. See F. TC. v. Check 
Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2007). With regard to the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act, the Seventh Circuit stated: 
The primary persons intended to be covered are independent debt collectors." S.Rep. 
No. 95-382, at 2, 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1697. The Senate Committee explained that 
the FDCP A was limited to third-party collectors of past due debts because, unlike 
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creditors, "who generally are restrained by the desire to protect their good will when 
collecting past due accounts," independent collectors are likely to have "no future 
contact with the consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion of 
them." Id at 1696. 
Id. The same rational is applicable to the ICCA exemption based on common ownership. The 
common ownership exemption provided by Idaho Code Section 26-2239(10) recognizes business 
entities with common ownership have an incentive to avoid the types of practices the ICCA is 
intended to regulate with regard to independent debt collectors. In this situation, C. Martin 
Wood, Ill's ownership of Respondent and his interest in HHK are aligned such that he would be 
very concerned with a customer's opinion of both Respondent and HHK. That mutual interest 
combined with the close relationship shared by Respondent and HHK presents a situation where 
the goal to regulate independent debt collectors would not be achieved by applying the ICCA to 
Respondent or this case. Respondent respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's 
determination that Respondent is not subject to the provisions of the ICCA. 
C. Appellant failed to properly assert his claims for an offset in this situation. 
The invoice provided to Appellants in Zimbabwe does more than establish Respondent's 
role in the 2012 big game hunt and Appellant's obligation to pay Respondent. Respondent is not 
a third-party beneficiary in this situation. Appellant owes an obligation to pay $26,040.00 
directly to Respondent, the consideration for which was supplied by HHK. See Sirius LC v. 
Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 42, 156 P.3d 539, 543 (2007). Appellant is not entitled to an offset 
against Respondent for his claims related to the 2012 big game hunt in this situation. Any claim 
that Jones may have regarding hunting trophies or his dissatisfaction with the 2012 hunt must be 
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asserted against HHK. A similar issue was addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in the second 
Sirius LC v. Erickson appeal, there the plaintiff asserted various affirmative defenses against the 
party to which the plaintiff owed an obligation which was supported by consideration provided 
by a third party. Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 84, 244 P.3d 224, 228 (2010). The Idaho 
Supreme Court determined that the affirmative defenses were not applicable to the party to 
which the plaintiff owed the obligation because the plaintiff has failed to impute the third party's 
conduct to the party to which the plaintiff owed the obligation. Id at 84-85, 228-229. 
Appellant has made no showing and can make no showing that any of the asserted 
affirmative defenses are applicable to Respondent. Appellant has failed to establish an obligation 
for Respondent to deliver any trophies to Respondent. Appellant has alleged that he is entitled to 
the delivery of certain trophies but has failed to allege any contractual basis for this obligation. 
R., pp. 17-18. With regard to the 2010 hunt, Appellant asserts that he was over charged for the 
elephant that he shot, however the fee schedule that he was provided with does not support his 
allegations. R., p. 121. In addition, Appellant specifically requested that the trophies from the 
2010 hunt not be transferred to the taxidermist in Zimbabwe. R., p. 148. Respondent also 
received payment in full from Appellant for both the 2010 and 2011 big game hunts after the 
2010 elephant was harvested. R., p. 58, ~ll 8. 
Appellant also asserts the fair market value of the elephant tusks harvested in 2010 and 
2012 exceeds the amount sought by Respondent. R., pp. 17-18. However, Jones ignores the 
impact of federal and international regulation including the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and 50 CFR § 23 on Appellant's ability to use the 
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elephant tusks as an offset in this situation. Appellant's trophies are raw African elephant ivory 
which can only be imported into the United States as a sport-hunted trophy and cannot be used 
for commercial purposes. See 50 CFR § 23.55. Accordingly, it would be unlawful for Appellant 
to use the trophies to satisfy his obligation to Respondent. 
D. Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5), Respondent, as the prevailing party, respectfully 
requests an award of its reasonable costs and attorney fees on appeal. Respondent's request is based 
upon Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) as the current action is an action to recover on a contract 
relating to the purchase of services. Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). Respondent's request is also based 
upon Idaho Code Section 12-120(1) as the amount pled in the Respondent's Verified Complaint 
was less than $35,000.00 and written demand was made for the payment of Respondent's claim 
more than ten days before Respondent' commenced this action. Idaho Code§ 12-120(1); R, p. 11, 
,Il; R., p. 9, ,IIO. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the Court deny Appellant's appeal in its entirety. 
The trial court acted properly in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent and 
respondent respectfully requests the Court affirm the trial court's determinations that Respondent 
was not governed by the Idaho Collection Agency Act and Respondent was entitled to summary 
judgment in this matter. 
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DATED this 17th day of March, 2015. 
WORST, FITZGERALD & STOVER, PLLC 
By: 
Louis V. Spiker 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct 
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